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THE ARGENTINE FINANCIAL CRISIS:
STATE LIABILITY UNDER BITS AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ICSID SYSTEM
William W. Burke-White*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, the international investment law regime has expanded
dramatically, particularly through an extraordinary increase in the number of bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) that confer direct rights on transnational investors.1 With well
over 2000 such treaties in force today, investors have considerable legal opportunities to
recoup loses caused by host-state impairment of transnational investments. This global
expansion of BITs has been accompanied by the development of the International Center
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a forum under the auspices of the
World Bank that allows for direct investor-state arbitration, generally of claims arising
out of alleged violations of BITs. Today, there are 143 states parties to the ICSID
Convention and investors in those states can bring claims directly against host-states for
damages. In the past few years, the ICSID caseload has also expanded, with over 120
cases pending as of late 2007. Taken collectively, these two developments provide
investors with unprecedented protections against host-state impairment of transnational
investments.
More than forty of the cases presently pending before ICSID have been brought
against the Republic of Argentina and assert that the Argentine government’s response to
the catastrophic financial crisis that hit that country in late 2001 and 2002 impaired
investor rights secured under a number of Argentina’s BITs. These cases are of
extraordinary importance, not just because of the immense financial liability to which
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As the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported in a 2000 study, the
“number of treaties quintupled during the decade [of the 1990s], rising from 385 at the end of the 1980s to
1,857 at the end of the 1990s. United Nations Conference on International Trade and Development,
Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999 (2000), UN DOC UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2, at iii.
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they expose Argentina, but also because, in response, Argentina has invoked a broad set
of legal arguments about the rights of states to craft policy responses to extraordinary
situations such as a massive financial collapse. Argentina has asserted two separate
arguments that go to the heart of the sovereign prerogative of states to develop
fundamental policies to address exceptional circumstances, one based on treaty law and
one based on customary international law. Argentina’s treaty law argument invokes the
non-precluded measures (NPM) provisions of Argentine BITs that exempt certain actions
taken by states in response to extraordinary circumstances from the substantive
protections of the treaties. Argentina’s customary international law argument has asserted
that the doctrine of necessity precludes the wrongfulness of Argentina’s actions in
response to the crisis. These arbitrations thus test the both the limits of state freedom of
action and investor protections under the BIT regime in exceptional circumstances.
The resulting jurisprudence of the ICSID Tribunals in four cases against Argentina
decided by early 2008 is deeply problematic, due in part to poor legal reasoning and
questionable treaty interpretation and, in part, to the contradictory holdings in the awards
issued to date. In fact, three of the four Tribunals have held Argentina fully responsible
for harms to investors notwithstanding the extreme financial crisis it faced, whereas the
remaining Tribunal absolved Argentina of much of its responsibility for those acts. This
article asserts that the tree ICSID Tribunals that have held Argentina liable failed to fully
recognize the treaty-based exceptions provided for in the NPM clauses of Argentina BITs
and have interpreted the customary law doctrine of necessity extremely narrowly–so
narrowly as to make it essentially unavailable to any state. Particularly when taken in
light of the Report of the Annulment Committee in the case of CMS v. Argentina which
rejected the legal reasoning of the arbitral tribunal in that case but failed to overturn the
substantive outcome of the Tribunal’s award, this problematic jurisprudence presents a
serious challenge to the legitimacy of the BIT regime and the ICSID system more
generally. While scholars have long noted a legitimacy deficit in investor-state arbitration
and predicted a crisis in the system, the Argentine cases may well be precipitating that
crisis both because these cases touch on the most fundamental policy choices of states
and because, for the first time, an Annulment Committee appears to be catalyzing a
rethinking of investor-state arbitration more generally through its own jurisprudence.
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This article argues that the awards issued in the Argentine cases to date exhibit
extremely poor legal analysis with substantive outcomes that do not reflect either the text
of Argentina’s BITs nor the intent of the state parties to those BITs. Moreover, the article
suggests that these awards have the potential to undermine the legitimacy and authority
of BIT arbitrations before ICSID and that, as a result of the CMS Annulment Committee
Report, some of the basic premises of investor state arbitration must be reconsidered.
The article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a brief background to Argentina’s
financial crisis and the cases pending against it. Part III analyzes Argentina’s legal
arguments in these cases, particularly its invocation of NPM clauses in the U.S.Argentina BIT and the customary law defense of necessity. Part IV considers the
contradictory approaches and decisions in the four ICSID awards decided in the
Argentine cases as of early 2008. Part V analyzes the Annulment Committee Decision in
CMS v. Argentina and suggests that the Committee may well have intended to prompt a
legitimacy crisis in the ICSID system and a more fundamental rethinking of state liability
under BITs.

II. THE ARGENTINE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE

In the last weeks of 2001, Argentina experienced a financial collapse of catastrophic
proportions.2 In one day alone, the Argentine peso lost 40% of its value.3 As the peso
collapsed, a run on banks followed. According to The Economist, throughout the
collapse, “income per person in dollar terms…shrunk from around $7,000 to just $3,500”
and “unemployment [rose] to perhaps 25%.”4 This economic chaos meant that, by late
2002, over half the Argentine population was living below the poverty line.5 The crisis
See PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND OUT): WALL STREET, THE IMF AND THE
BANKRUPTING OF ARGENTINA 1–2 (2005). For a discussion of the economic background to the collapse,
see Mario Damill, Roberto Frenkel & Martin Rapetti, The Argentinean Debt: History, Default and
Restructuring 2–18 (Apr. 2005, revised Aug. 2005) (unpublished CEDES working paper), available at
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/ ipd/pub/Frenkel_SDR_Eng.pdf.
3
See Certificate Concerning the State of Necessity in Argentina, Guillermo Nielsen, Secretary of Finance
of Argentina, Jan. 2003, ¶ 11 [hereinafter Nielsen Declaration] (on file with author). Certification was
made by the Argentine government to the courts adjudicating the debt cases and the ICSID cases arising
out of the economic crisis.
4
Argentina’s Collapse: A Decline Without Parallel, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 2–8, 2002, at 26, 26.
5
Nielsen Declaration, supra note 3, ¶ 5; see also Slump Turns Jobless Argentines Into Scavengers, N.Y.
2
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soon spread from the economic to the political sphere. In December 2001, one day of
riots left 30 civilians dead and led to the resignation of President Fernando de la Rua and
the collapse of the government. A “tragicomic spectacle of a succession of five presidents
taking office over a mere ten days” followed.6
In response to the crisis, which has been likened to the Great Depression of the 1930s
in the United States,7 Argentina adopted a number of measures to stabilize the economy
and restore political confidence. Among these efforts was a significant devaluation of the
peso through the termination of the currency board which had pegged the peso to the U.S.
dollar, the pesification of all financial obligations,8 and the effective freezing of all bank
accounts through a series of measures known collectively as the Corralito.9
Though these measures offered a long-term prospect of restored economic confidence
and stability, they also imposed immediate and painful costs on all participants in the
Argentine economy, including foreign investors. While Argentine citizens had little legal
recourse, many foreign investors who were harmed by Argentina’s response to the crisis
sought legal protection under the regime of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which
Argentina had entered into during the 1980s and 1990s.10 Such treaties offered investors
guarantees including the internationalization of contractual breaches, national treatment,
and most-favored nation protections.11 In addition, these treaties often provided investors
the possibility of direct investor-state arbitration before the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).12
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, at § 1, at 14. Beginning in late November 2000, massive strikes swept Argentina.
On November 23, 2000, “[m]illions of workers stayed off their jobs in the largest national strike in years as
a union–led protest against government austerity measures virtually paralyzed the country.” Argentina:
Strikes Against Austerity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2000, at A6.
6
BLUSTEIN, supra note 2, at 1.
7
See, e.g., A Survey of Capitalism and Democracy: Liberty’s Great Advance, ECONOMIST, June 28, 2003,
at 4, 6 (“Argentina has endured an economic collapse to match the Great Depression of the 1930s….”).
8
See Law No. 25561, Jan. 7, 2002, 29810 B.O. 1, available at
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=71477.
9
See Decree No. 1570, Dec. 3, 2001, 29787 B.O. 1, available at
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=70355. For reference to the measures as the
Corralito, see, for example, CARINA LOPEZ, STANDARD & POOR’S, THE ARGENTINE CRISIS: A
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AFTER THE SOVEREIGN DEFAULT (Apr. 12, 2002),
http://www.standardandpoors.com/europe/francais/Fr_news/Argentine-Chronology-of-Events_12-0402.html.
10
For a list of Argentine BITs, see U.N. Conference on Int’l Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Bilateral
Investment Treaties 1959–1999, at 26–27, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (Dec. 2000) (prepared by
Abraham Negash), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf.
11
For a discussion of protections often found in BITs, see M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 233–58 (2004); Andrew Guzman, Book Note, The International Law on Foreign
Investment, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 612, 613–14 (1995).
12
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) has been created under the
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For investors harmed by Argentina’s response to the economic crisis, the possibility of
direct arbitration against the Argentine government for breaches of BITs offered a
potentially promising means to recoup losses suffered during the crisis. Claims framed as
a violation of a BIT could be brought directly against Argentina through ICSID. Only
limited means are available to challenge ICSID awards and such awards are generally
perceived as enforceable in national courts. Not surprisingly, then, Argentina has become
subject to no fewer than forty-three ICSID arbitrations brought by investors who assert
that Argentina’s response to the crisis harmed investments protected by various BITs.13
Argentina’s potential liability from these cases alone could be greater than U.S. $8
billion, more than the entire financial reserves of the Argentine government in 2002.14
Some have speculated that the total value of potential claims against Argentina could
reach U.S. $80 billion.15
III.

ARGENTINA’S LEGAL ARGUMENTS FOR POLICY FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE
TO AN ECONOMIC CRISIS

In response to this onslaught of ICSID arbitrations, Argentina has, not surprisingly,
denied that its actions in fact caused the harms asserted by investors.16 Argentina’s legal
approach has also gone considerably further, asserting two broad arguments which raise
deeper structural questions about the rights of states to respond to extraordinary situations
such as a massive financial crisis. Specifically, Argentina has invoked the NPM clauses
of its BITs and has asserted that the state of necessity in customary international law
precludes the wrongfulness of its actions. These arguments suggest, first, as a matter of
treaty law and, second, as a matter of customary law, that states in circumstances such as
auspices of the World Bank to hear such cases. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention], available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm.
13
For a listing of concluded and pending cases before ICSID, see The World Bank Group, International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: ICSID Cases,
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/cases.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
14
Gabriel Bottini, Counsel, Office of the Attorney Gen., Republic of Arg., Issues of Jurisdiction and
Merits Arising from the Argentine Litigation at ICSID, Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania Journal
of International Economic Law Symposium: International Investment and Transnational Litigation:
Challenges of Growing and Expanding Investor State Disputes (Feb. 2, 2007).
15
Wailin Wong, Argentina Treasury Attorney: World Bank Claims Could Reach $80 Billion, DOW JONES
INT’L NEWS, Jan. 21. 2005.
16
See LG&E v. Argentina Republic, Respondent’s Memorial on the Merits.
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that which Argentina faced in 2001 and 2002 have a legal right to take actions that could
harm investors and that would in ordinary circumstances violate BIT obligations. In an
ever more globalized world in which exceptional circumstances such as financial crises,
terrorist threats, and public health emergencies—are all too common, the ability of states
to craft viable policy responses becomes ever more critical. In that context, the Argentine
ICSID cases test the extent of state freedom to craft critical policy choices and the reach
of investor protection under BITs and customary law in the face of exceptional, but far
from uncommon, emergencies.
Argentina’s first legal response has been to invoke a long-dormant treaty clause in the
BITs under which investors brought their claims against Argentina and that appeared
perfectly tailored to deal with just such a situation.17 Argentina’s BITs with the United
States, Germany, and the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) each contain a
non-precluded measures (NPM) provision that limits the applicability of investor
protections under the BIT in exceptional circumstances. These NPM clauses allow states
to take actions otherwise inconsistent with the treaty when, for example, the actions are
necessary for the protection of essential security, the maintenance of public order, or to
respond to a public health emergency.18 NPM provisions effectively “permit host-state
impairment of covered investment” and, in turn, weaken the BIT “as an instrument for
regulating host-state governments.”19 As long as the host-state’s actions are taken in
pursuit of one of the permissible objectives specified in the NPM clause, acts otherwise
prohibited by the treaty do not constitute breaches of the treaty and states should face no
liability under the BIT. The lawyers in Argentina’s Procuración del Tesoro de la Nación
have argued that the economic collapse of 2001–2002 triggered the NPM clauses of
many of its BITs and thereby relieved the state of liability and any duty to compensate
investors.20
A few examples of NPM clauses offer an overview of their form and legal implications
for state freedom of action in response to extraordinary crises such as the Argentine
See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 332-55
(May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS Award], available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/CMS_Award.pdf.
18
See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.–Arg.,
art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103–2 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina BIT].
19
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the BITs, 11 INT’L TAX &
BUS. LAW. 159, 170 (1993).
20
For one such clause, see, for example, U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 18, art. XI.
17
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financial collapse. The first U.S. BIT, signed with Panama in 1982, stipulates in Article X
that “[t]his treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of any and all
measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations
with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or the
protection of its own essential security interests.”21 Over the years, the United States has
developed new versions of its Model BIT and, hence, variations in the form and structure
of the NPM clause have appeared over time. One of the more notable modifications
occurred in the late 1990s when the United States clarified its position on the self-judging
nature of the NPM clauses in its BITs by including explicit language to that effect, now
stating that a party was not precluded from taking any measures that “it considers
necessary” for the protection of the stated permissible objectives. The NPM clause in the
U.S.-Argentina BIT, drafted before this clarification of the self-judging nature of the
treaty, provides: “[t]his treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of any and
all measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and
security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.”22
NPM clauses, such as that found in the U.S.-Argentina BIT, contain three basic
elements. First, they provide for a nexus requirement. NPM clauses require that measures
taken by a state that would otherwise deviate from a treaty obligation must be sufficiently
related to the permissible objectives specified in the clause. This relationship is termed
the “nexus requirement.” One widely used phrasing of the nexus requirement found, for
example, in the U.S.-Argentina BIT, requires that for measures to be covered by the
clause they have to be “necessary” for the attainment of one of the specified permissible
objectives.23 Second, NPM clauses specify their scope of applicability, in that they either
apply to an entire BIT or can be written in a more limited form so that they apply only to
a subset of the treaty’s substantive provisions. The NPM clauses in U.S. BITs provide
21

Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments, U.S.-Pan., art. X(1), Oct. 27, 1982, 21
I.L.M. 1227 [hereinafter U.S.-Panama BIT]. A subsequent protocol amending the dispute settlement
provisions of the original treaty was signed on June 1, 2000; see Protocol Amending Investment Treaty
with Panama, U.S.-Pan., June 1, 2000, S. Treaty Doc. 106-46 (2000), available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_panama_2000.pdf.
22
U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 18, art. XI..
23
The NPM clauses in the U.S. BITs consistently use the “necessary for” wording. See, e.g., Treaty
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, U.S.-Mozam., art. XIV, Dec. 1,
1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106–31 (2000) [hereinafter U.S.-Mozambique BIT].
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that “[t]his Treaty shall not preclude”24 the application of the subsequently specified
measures. As a result, the successful invocation of the NPM clause precludes the
existence of a violation with respect to any and all substantive treaty provisions. In
contrast, NPM clauses of a more limited scope, such as those found in German BITs,
apply only to certain substantive clauses of the BIT, for example the guarantee of no
“treatment less favourable.” Finally, NPM clauses establish a list of permissible
objectives, toward which a state’s actions must be directed if they are to be covered by
the exception provided for by the NPM clause. Permissible objectives in BIT NPM
clauses include security, international peace and security, public order, public health, and
public morality, among others. The U.S.-Argentina BIT, for example, specifies three
permissible objectives: essential security, public order, and international peace and
security.
Despite the fact that NPM clauses are, in fact, relatively widespread in BIT agreements
and occur in most, if not all, BITs of the U.S., Germany, India, Canada and the BelgianLuxembourg Union, the Argentine cases present the first test of such cases in investorstate arbitration.25 In each of the cases arising under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, Argentina
has argued that its actions in response to the financial crisis of 2001-2002 were justified
as measures necessary to protect essential security and public order and that, because
those actions fell within the provisions of the NPM clause, they did not violate the
substantive protections accorded investors under the U.S.-Argentina BIT. As a result,
Argentina has claimed that no internationally wrongful acts were committed and no state
liability should attach.
In arguing that the NPM clause of the U.S.-Argentina BIT precludes Argentina’s
liability under the treaty, Argentina has asserted that the NPM clause should be
interpreted as self-judging. Although the U.S.-Argentina BIT did not include expressly
self-judging terms such as which it considers necessary, found in later U.S.-BITs,
Argentina has relied on a mutual understanding of the term evidenced in the treaty’s
See, e.g., U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 21 (emphasis added); U.S.-Mozambique BIT, supra note 23
(emphasis added).
25
Similar clauses can also be fond in a number of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties and have
been considered in two cases before the International Court of Justice. See Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 15 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua
Judgment (Merits)]; see also Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Preliminary Objection, 1996 I.C.J. 803, 811
(Dec. 12).
24
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context and travaux preparatoires from a consistent U.S. practice that such NPM clauses
are understood as self-judging.26 In the alternative, Argentina has asserted that, even if
the NPM clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT is not found to be self-judging, the terms of
the clause were satisfied by the situation in Argentina in late 2001 and 2002.
In addition to the treaty-based defense provided by the NPM clauses in its BITs,
Argentina has also invoked the doctrine of necessity in customary international law to
preclude liability for harms to investors. The customary defense of necessity provides
that a state may not be liable for actions taken to “safeguard an essential interest against a
grave and imminent peril.”27 According to the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft
Articles):
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that
State unless the act: (a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential
interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) Does not seriously impair an
essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of
the international community as a whole. 2. In any case, necessity may not be
invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if: (a) The
international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity;
or (b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity.28
A successful invocation of the necessity defense precludes the wrongfulness of a
state’s actions and thereby allows the state to possibly avoid both responsibility and
liability. As the Draft Articles explain, the defense of necessity is a secondary rule of
customary international law that governs “the circumstances in which the wrongfulness
of conduct under international law may be precluded.”29 Argentina has argued that the
financial crisis of 2001 and 2002 impaired the country’s essential interests and that the
26

For a more detailed discussion of the self-judging nature of U.S. BITs, see William W. Burke-White &
Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of
Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 307 (2008).
27
See Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
with Commentaries, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles], available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf. (“Necessity may not be
invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an
international obligation of that State unless the act: (a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an
essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest
of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.”).
See also Gabcikovo–Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 39 (Sept. 25).
28
See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 27, art. 24(14).
29
See Id.
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various legislative measures Argentina took in response thereto where the only available
response to that crisis. As a result, Argentina has asserted that the criteria for customary
law defense of necessity were met, precluding the wrongfulness of its actions
independently from its argument with respect to the treaty-based NPM exception.
Argentina’s plea of necessity under customary law represents the first modern
necessity claim in investor-state arbitration. While the International Court of Justice
recognized the validity of the necessity defense in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Projects
Case, the Court found the defense inapplicable in the case as Hungary was deemed to
have other means available to address the environmental threats to its essential interests.30
In its submissions to ICSID, Argentina has also relied on a number of earlier cases before
arbitral tribunals and the Permanent Court of International Justice, in which necessity was
claimed on the basis of a state’s financial problems and in which tribunals applied a more
lenient standard than did the ICJ in Gabcikovo, including Société Commerciale de
Belgique31 and the Serbian Loans Case.32
The four arbitrations against Argentina decided thus far and the remaining claims still
pending provide a critical test of both the interpretation and applicability of NPM clauses
and the availability of the customary law defense of necessity in response to a major
economic crisis. In so doing, these cases test the flexibility available to states to craft
policy responses to emergencies and the scope of investor protections in such
circumstances.
IV.

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ICSID TRIBUNALS

The four awards handed down in the Argentine cases as of early 2008 consider both
the NPM exception and the necessity defense advanced by Argentina and reach

See Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 40, 42. The Court noted “that, even supposing, as
Hungary maintained, that the construction and operation of the dam would have created serious risks,
Hungary had means available to it, other than the suspension and abandonment of the works, of responding
to that situation. It could for example have proceeded regularly to discharge gravel into the river
downstream of the dam.” Id. at 42.
31
Société Commerciale de Belgique, 1939, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 78, p. 160; Secretariat Survey, ¶. 288.
32
Case Concerning Certain Serbian Loans, 1929, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 20; Secretariat Survey, ¶s. 263268. See also International Law Commission, Commentaries on the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, at Art 25, p. 141, fn. 410.
30
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contradictory and, at times, legally questionable conclusions.33 Whereas the Tribunals in
the cases of CMS v. Argentina, Enron v. Argentina and Sempra v. Argentina found both
the NPM clause and the necessity defense inapplicable, the Tribunal in LG&E v.
Argentina found the NPM clause properly invoked and the necessity defense potentially
applicable to Argentina.34
Significantly, however, both the jurisprudence and legal reasoning of these ICSID
Tribunals is often problematic. Not only do these Tribunals essentially ignore the treatybased NPM exception and restrict the necessity defense, the findings of at least three of
the Tribunals appear to overlook the basic bargain between investor protection and state
freedom of action inherent in a BIT and, thereby, limit the state’s ability to respond to
exceptional situations, such as financial crises, in ways that that may threaten the longterm willingness of states to participate in investor-state arbitration and, perhaps, the
legitimacy of that system itself.
1. The ICSID Tribunals and Non-Precluded Measures Provisions

While the four Tribunals that have issued awards in the Argentina cases reach different
substantive outcomes and their decisions take distinct approaches to the function of NPM
clauses, they agree on at least two critical points. First, the Tribunals interpret the
essential security and public order provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT broadly enough
to encompass economic emergencies, such as the financial crisis that enveloped
Argentina in late 2001 and 2002.

The four cases decided to date are: CMS, supra note 17; LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. Arb/02/1, Decision on Liability (Oct. 3, 2006), ¶¶ 226, 266 [hereinafter LG&E Decision
on Liability], available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/09_LGE_Liability_e.pdf., ¶ 212;
Enron Award, supra note 35, ¶ 337.; 33. Enron Corp. Ponderosa Asset, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. Arb/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007) [hereinafter Enron Award], available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf at ¶ 373; and Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/02/16, Award, ¶ 391 (Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Sempra Award],
available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Sempra_Energy-Award.pdf, at ¶ 388. The CMS
case is presently subject to annulment proceedings. The arbitral panel in the CMS case consisted of
Francisco Orrego Vicuna (President), Marc Lalonde and Francisco Rezek. The LG&E panel consisted of
Tatiana de Maekelt (President), Francisco Rezek, and Albert Jan van den Berg. The Enron panel consisted
of Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Albert Jan van den Berg and Pierre Yves Tschanz.
34
See Enron Award, supra note 33, ¶¶ 226–66 (“Argentina is exempt of responsibility, and accordingly,
the Claimants should bear the consequences of the measures taken by the host State….”); CMS Award,
supra note 17, ¶ 387. The divergent decisions raise the problem of an arbitral system without meaningful
appellate authority and no means of resolving different outcomes based on nearly identical facts.
33
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A second area of agreement between the Tribunals is their interpretation of the NPM
clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT as not self-judging.35 While the language of the NPM
clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT is not explicitly self-judging, Argentina has argued that
it should be interpreted as self-judging, again based on long-standing practice of the
United States. The Tribunals unanimously reject this claim and, therefore, apply a
substantive review to Argentina’s invocation of the clause rather than a less strict good
faith test.36
Yet, the Tribunals justify this common approach to the NPM clause as non-selfjudging on very different grounds. For the CMS Tribunal, the non-self-judging character
of the U.S.-Argentina NPM clause is based on a textual comparison of the NPM clause in
the treaty with other instruments, such as GATT, that are explicitly self-judging and the
ICJ’s treatment of similar language in the Nicaragua case.37 In contrast, the
determinations by the LG&E Tribunal and the Enron Tribunal are, in part, based on
supposed consideration of the parties’ understandings at the time the treaty was
concluded. In the words of the LG&E Tribunal: “[b]ased on the evidence before the
Tribunal regarding the understanding of the Parties in 1991 at the time the Treaty was
signed, the Tribunal decides and concludes that the provision is not self-judging.”38 In
reaching this conclusion, the LG&E Tribunal recognizes that the “language of the BIT
does not specify who should decide what constitutes essential security measures–either
Argentina itself, subject to a review under a good faith standard, or the Tribunal,” and
looks to both the background materials and broader context of the treaty negotiations.39
Despite the four Tribunals’ agreement on the non-self-judging nature of the NPM clause,
only the Sempra Tribunal gives serious consideration to the weighty evidence of the
common intent of the United States and Argentina that the clause should be selfEnron Award, supra note 33, ¶ 373; Sempra Award, supra note 33, at ¶ 388, 391.
The author has argued elsewhere that, due to the extensive US practice interpreting NPM clauses as selfjudging, the clause contained in the U.S.-Argentina BIT should be interpreted as self-judging and subject
only to good faith review by an arbitral tribunal and not a full substantive review of the state’s policies. See
Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 26.
37
CMS Award, supra note 17, ¶ 371.
38
LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, at ¶¶ 226, 266; Enron Award, supra note 33, at ¶ 337.
39
LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, ¶ 212. For example, the tribunal considers when the U.S.
policy with respect to self–judging NPM clauses became explicit and finds that did not occur until 1992,
after the U.S.-Argentina BIT was signed. Id. ¶ 213. Despite the agreement of the two tribunals that the
NPM clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT is not self–judging, there is reason to question both tribunals’
decisions. As noted above, prior to the conclusion of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the United States had
asserted a self-judging interpretation of the NPM clause in its BITs.
35
36
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judging.40 Yet, even the Sempra Tribunal, notably composed of two arbitrators who also
served in the CMS case, dismisses the relevance of that evidence and also concludes that
the NPM clause is non-self-judging.41
Despite agreement on the applicability of the NPM clause to economic emergencies
and its non-self-judging nature, the four awards differ on a number of significant issues.
A first key difference among the decisions is their approach to the relationship between
the NPM clause in the treaty and the customary law defense of necessity.42 The CMS
Tribunal, the Enron Tribunal, and the Sempra Tribunal effectively read the requirements
of the customary international law defense of necessity into the NPM clause of the treaty,
testing Argentina’s invocation of the NPM clause against the basic requirements of the
necessity defense in customary international law.43 The Enron Tribunal observes:
“because there is no specific guidance” as to the interpretation of the NPM clause “under
the treaty…[it is] necessary to rely on the requirements of the state of necessity under
customary law.”44 Likewise, the CMS Tribunal begins its analysis of Article XI with
explicit reference to “Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility” which addresses
the necessity defense in customary law and asks whether “the plea of necessity
would…be precluded.”45 In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal considers Article XI of the BIT
and the state of necessity in customary international law independently and does not
impose the requirements of customary international law on Argentina’s invocation of the
treaty-based NPM clause. The LG&E Tribunal notes:
The concept of excusing a State for the responsibility for violation of its
international obligations during what is called a “state of necessity” or “state of
emergency” also exists in international law. While the Tribunal considers that the
protections afforded by Article XI have been triggered in this case, and are
See Enron Award, supra note 33, ¶ 337; LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, ¶ 212; CMS
Award, supra note 17, ¶ 371.
41
See Sempra Award, supra note 33, at ¶¶ 382–88.
42
For a discussion of the treatment of the state of necessity in the two cases, see August Reinisch,
Necessity in International Arbitration—An Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases?
Comments on CMS v. Argentina and LG&E v. Argentina, 3 TRANSNATI’L DISP. MGMT. (2006); Stephan
W. Schill, International Investment Law and the Host State’s Power to Handle Economic Crises, 24 J.
INT’L ARB. 265, 277–84 (2007).
43
CMS Award, supra note 17, ¶ 357 (asking if, “in the context of Article 25 of the Articles on State
Responsibility [the necessity defense], the act in question does not seriously impair an essential interest of
the State or States towards which the obligation exists”); see also Sempra Award, supra note 33, ¶ 376
(“The Treaty provision is inseparable from the customary law standard.”).
44
Enron Award, supra note 33, ¶ 333.
45
CMS Award, supra note 17, ¶¶ 353, 358. The CMS tribunal did analyze Article XI of the treaty
independently of the customary defense of necessity, but read the customary law standards for invoking
necessity back into its analysis of the NPM clause. Id. ¶¶ 353–358.
40
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sufficient to excuse Argentina’s liability, the Tribunal recognizes that satisfaction
of the state of necessity standard as it exists in international law (reflected in
Article 25 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility) supports the
Tribunal’s conclusion.46
Although the fact that the requirements of the customary defense of necessity have
been satisfied may support the LG&E Tribunal’s findings, the successful invocation of
the NPM clause ought to be based on a separate test and distinct evidence, independent
from the customary defense of necessity itself. For the LG&E Tribunal, the NPM clause
is a separate risk allocation device and an explicit part of the bargain in the U.S.Argentina BIT, providing the states parties greater protections than would have been
available in customary law. For the CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals, in contrast, the
NPM clause appears to be merely a textual restatement of the pre-existing customary
defense of necessity that has no independent legal impact.
As both a legal and policy matter, the approach taken by the LG&E Tribunal is far
more appropriate. Legally, reading the customary defense of necessity into the NPM
clause both violates the Vienna Convention rule of lex specialis and the canonical rule
that each treaty provision must be given effect. As a matter of policy, the incorporation of
the necessity defense into the NPM clause fails to recognize the actual understanding of
the U.S. and Argentina, whereby, in exchange for granting investors greater protections
than would have been available in customary law, the states also sought to preserve for
themselves greater freedom of action through the NPM clause than would have been
available in customary international law.
A second area of significant disagreement among the four Tribunals is the level of
deference they accord to Argentina’s invocation of the NPM clause. While all the
Tribunals agree the clause is not self-judging, the CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals
apply a far more rigorous standard to the nexus requirement under the NPM clause,
importing the customary law requirements of necessity and requiring Argentina to show
that the actions it took were the only ones available to the government to respond to the
crisis. Although the Sempra Tribunal recognizes that “it is not the task of the tribunal to
substitute its view for the government’s choices,” its interpretation of the “only available
means” requirement essentially removes all policy responses from the NPM clause
46

LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, ¶ 245.
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exception simply by finding that there were more than one possible response to the
crisis.47 In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal takes an approach somewhat closer to the margin
of appreciation doctrine in European human rights law, according to which an
international tribunal will give discretion to the state itself to craft its policies within a
margin of international supervision. The LG&E Tribunal suggests, for example, that were
it “to conclude that the provision is self-judging, Argentina’s determination would be
subject to a good faith review anyway, which does not significantly differ from the
substantive analysis presented here.”48 In essence, then, the LG&E Tribunal reduces the
level of scrutiny of Argentina’s invocation of Article XI down to something close to a
good faith review and appears to afford Argentina a margin of appreciation in which to
make its own determinations of the appropriate responses to the crisis. For example, the
LG&E Tribunal found:
Certainly, the conditions in Argentina in December 2001 called for immediate,
decisive action to restore civil order and stop the economic decline.…Article XI
refers to situations in which a State has no choice but to act. A State may have
several responses at its disposal to maintain public order or protect its essential
security interests.49
The LG&E approach recognizes the subjective nature of certain permissible objectives
under the BIT and finds that states, rather than ICSID Tribunals, are often in the best
position to craft appropriate policy responses to emergency situations.
A third area of substantive disagreement among the Tribunals is the question of
compensation. While the CMS Tribunal did not find either the requirements of necessity
in customary international law or the standards of the NPM clause met, it suggested that
neither provision would, even if applicable, excuse the state invoking the clause of
liability and the duty to pay compensation.50 In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal opined that
“Article XI establishes the state of necessity as a ground for exclusion from wrongfulness
of an act of the State, and therefore, the State is exempted from liability.”51 As a
Sempra Award, supra note 33, ¶¶ 350–51. This approach fails to give the government any policy
flexibility and does not recognize that some policy options may be more or less effective in responding to
the crisis.
48
LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, ¶ 214.
49
Id. ¶¶ 238–39.
50
The CMS Tribunal observed, for example, that “the plea of state of necessity may preclude the
wrongfulness of an act, but it does not exclude the duty to compensate the owner of the right which had
been sacrificed.” Hence, “in the absence of agreement between the parties the duty of the tribunal in these
cases is to determine the compensation due.” CMS Award, supra note 17, ¶¶ 388, 394.
51
LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, ¶ 261.
47
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consequence, the LG&E Tribunal found that Argentina was not liable for damages to
investors during the period of emergency.52 Given that the very purpose of the NPM
clause was to guarantee states greater freedom of action in the face of extraordinary
circumstances in exchange for enhanced protections for investors, the approach taken by
the LG&E Tribunal appears to better reflect the bargain inherent in the NPM clause of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT. If such clauses were not intended to prevent liability, they would not
in fact serve the purpose of guaranteeing greater freedom of action to states in cases of
emergency as such states would remain liable notwithstanding the NPM clause.
Despite the LG&E Tribunal’s more favorable stance toward Argentina, the awards in
the CMS, Enron, and Sempra arbitrations severely limit the applicability of the NPM
clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT. By requiring Argentina’s invocation of the NPM clause
to meet the requirements of the necessity defense in customary international law and
providing very little deference to Argentina’s policy choices in response to the financial
crisis, the these three Tribunals make it extremely difficult for any state to invoke the
NPM clause of a BIT instrument, thereby narrowing the state’s potential policy responses
in a crisis situation and ensuring that, notwithstanding the inclusion of an NPM clause in
the BIT, the state remains liable to investors for harms caused by policy responses to such
a crisis.
The jurisprudence of the ICSID Tribunals in the Argentina cases is particularly
problematic for two reasons. First, the legal reasoning in these awards is often deeply
flawed. Specifically, by conflating the NPM clause with the customary defense of
necessity, the Tribunals violate the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation (ut
res magis valeat quam pereat). As the WTO Appellate body found in the U.S.-Gasoline
case, “[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna
Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty.
An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or
paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.”53 Reading an NPM clause as equivalent
Id. ¶ 266 (“Based on the analysis of the state of necessity, the Tribunal concludes that, first, said state
started on December 1, 2001 and ended on April 26, 2003; second, during that period Argentina is exempt
of responsibility, and accordingly, the Claimants should bear the consequences of the measures taken by
the host State.”).
53
Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline]. Similarly, Professor Fitzmaurice observes, “texts are to be presumed to have been intended to
52
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to the customary defense of necessity would render the clause pointless because the
customary defense of necessity would be available to states irrespective of the inclusion
of the NPM clause in a BIT. In order to satisfy the principle of effectiveness in treaty
interpretation, NPM clauses must be read as distinct rules that states create in their treaty
relationships, independent of the necessity defense in customary international law, and
establishing a separate grounds for precluding state liability.
A second fundamental problem with the jurisprudence of the Tribunals in the
Argentine cases is that it fails to do justice to the intent of the parties as expressed in the
clear language of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. As the drafting history of the U.S-Argentina
BIT indicates, the U.S. and Argentina included an NPM provision precisely because they
sought to secure for themselves greater policy flexibility in response to exceptional
circumstances than would have been ordinarily available under customary international
law.54 By failing to recognize the scope of the NPM clause as intended by the parties and
drafted into the BIT, the Tribunals foreclose the very policy options that the U.S. and
Argentina sought to preserve for themselves in extreme situations and provide investors
with greater protections than the states intended to confer on them. The result is not just
poor law, but also a direct challenge to states parties to BIT instruments with NPM
clauses that forces them to ask whether ICSID Tribunals will, in fact, interpret BITs in a
balanced way that conforms to the intent of the drafters as memorialized in a BIT. To the
degree that such tribunals overstep the intent of the states parties and the plain language
of the BIT itself, they may well chill states from entering into further BIT instruments
and subjecting themselves to ICSID jurisdiction.
2. The ICSID Tribunals and The Customary Defense of Necessity

have a definite force and effect, and should be interpreted so as to have such force and effect rather than so
as not to have it and so as to have the fullest value and effect consistent with their wording.” G. G.
Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and
Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 8 (1951); see also H. Lauterpacht, Restrictive
Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 48
(1949).
54
For a discussion of the drafting history of the NPM clause and the US BIT program more generally, see
Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 26.
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In addition to asserting the exception to the substantive protections of the BIT provided
for by the NPM clause, Argentina has also invoked the separate defense of necessity
under customary international law in each of the ICSID arbitrations against it. Despite the
fact that the four Tribunals that have issued awards in the Argentine cases have
improperly conflated the treaty-based NPM clause with the customary law defense of
necessity, each Tribunal does offer an opinion on the applicability of the necessity
defense to the Argentine financial crisis. Although the LG&E Tribunal found that the
necessity defense might be available to Argentina, the CMS, Enron and Sempra Tribunals
all held the necessity defense inapplicable and the wrongfulness of Argentina’s actions
not precluded. All four Tribunals accept the ILC’s Draft Articles as the definitive
interpretation of the necessity defense in customary law and apply the criteria specified in
the Draft Articles to determine the applicability of the necessity defense. While the CMS,
Enron and Sempra Tribunals suggest somewhat different standards for the invocation of
necessity under customary law, all three offer such narrow interpretations of necessity so
as to make the defense essentially unavailable to a state attempting to devise a policy
response to a severe crisis or other emergency.
As an initial matter, the CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals find that the economic
crisis, which befell Argentina, was not of a sufficient magnitude to threaten Argentina’s
essential interests and, thereby, open the door to a necessity defense. The CMS Tribunal,
for example, notes that: “The Tribunal is convinced that the crisis was indeed severe….
However, neither could it be held that wrongfulness should be precluded as a matter of
course under the circumstances.”55 Similarly, while acknowledging that Argentina faced
a severe crisis, the Enron Tribunal opines that “the argument that such a situation
compromised the very existence of the State and its independence so as to qualify as
involving an essential interest of the State is not convincing.”56 In contrast, the LG&E
Tribunal found that the financial crisis in Argentina was sufficient to imperil an essential
interest and, thereby, open the door to the necessity defense: “As evidence demonstrates,
economic, financial or those interests related to the protection of the State against any
danger seriously compromising its internal or external situation, are also considered

55
56

CMS Award, supra note 17, ¶ 320.
Enron Award, supra note 33, at ¶306.
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essential interests.”57
A second issue considered by all four Tribunals arises from article 25(1)(a) of the
Draft Articles, according to which the defense of necessity is only available if the actions
taken by the state were “the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest
against a grave and imminent peril.”58 As the ILC Commentaries to the Draft Articles
provide: “The plea is excluded if there are other (otherwise lawful) means available, even
if they may be more costly or less convenient.”59 The key question facing the four
Tribunals in this regard was how to interpret the no other available means requirement.
Would it be sufficient to invalidate the plea of necessity if, for example, there were some
other policy choice open to Argentina or would it have to be shown that there was an
equally effective policy response open to Argentina that would not have breached the
substantive protections of the BIT? At its core, that is a question of how much deference
to give the Argentine government’s determination that its policy choice was the only or
best available response to the crisis.
Again, the CMS, Enron and Sempra Tribunals offer extremely narrow interpretations
of the necessity defense, essentially second-guessing Argentina’s policy choices and
suggesting that, because some other means was available to Argentina to respond to the
crisis, the necessity defense was legally unavailable. The CMS Tribunal, for example,
finds that the ILC’s comment “that the plea of necessity is ‘excluded if there are other
(otherwise lawful) means available, even if they may be more costly or less convenient,’
is persuasive in assisting this Tribunal in concluding that the measures adopted were not
the only steps available.”60 Similarly, the Enron Tribunal notes: “A rather sad world
comparative experience in the handling of economic crises, shows that there are always
many approaches to address and correct such critical events, and it is difficult to justify
that none of them were available in the Argentine case.”61 The CMS, Enron and Sempra
Tribunals all fail to suggest alternative courses of action Argentina could have followed62
LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, at ¶ 251.
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, supra note 28, at art. 25.
59
ILC Commentaries, supra note 28, art. 25, pg 203, ¶16.
60
CMS Award, supra note 17, at ¶ 324.
61
Enron Award, supra note 33, at ¶308. See also Sempra Award, supra note 33, at ¶ 350 (providing a
word-for-word identical discussion as the CMS Tribunal).
62
The Sempra Tribunal merely notes that “it is not the task of the Tribunal to substitute its view for the
57
58

19

or to consider the counterfactual argument of the results such alternative policies might
have entailed for both the state and investors. The three Tribunals simply assert that if
any alternative policy choice is available—regardless of its likely effectiveness—the
necessity defense is unavailable. Since states always face a range of policy choices in
response to any issue, whichever policy a state chooses is, by definition, not the only
available response to the crisis. The three Tribunals thus give no deference whatsoever to
Argentina’s policy choices and, essentially, vitiate the necessity defense as a matter of
law.
In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal gives considerable deference to Argentina’s own
policy choices in response to the crisis, recognizing that an ad hoc arbitral tribunal is
poorly positioned to second-guess the policies of the government. The LG&E Tribunal
observes: “In this circumstance, an economic recovery package was the only means to
respond to the crisis. Although there may have been a number of ways to draft the
economic recovery plan, the evidence before the Tribunal demonstrates that an acrossthe-board response was necessary, and the tariffs on public utilities had to be
addressed.”63 The LG&E Tribunal does not ask if a slightly different recovery package
could have been employed, but merely determines that some across-the-board recovery
package was needed. It pays deference to Argentina’s determination that the specific
policies adopted by the country were the most appropriate in the circumstances and finds
that the criteria for invocation of the necessity defense in customary law were satisfied.
This approach is far more appropriate in that it leaves open the necessity defense as long
as some other clearly available and less restrictive policy alternative would not have
provided an obviously adequate response to the crisis with less harm to the interests of
investors.
The final issue with respect to the invocation of the necessity defense in customary
law considered by all four Tribunals is whether Argentina contributed to the situation of
necessity.64 The four Tribunals ask what level of contribution by a state to a crisis would
be necessary to render the necessity defense inapplicable. In the Gabcikovo-Nagymoros
Government’s choice between economic options. It is instead the Tribunal’s duty only to determine
whether the choice made was the only one available, and this does not appear to have been the case.”
Sempra Award, supra note 33, at ¶ 351.
63
LGE Decision on Liability, supra note 33, at ¶ 257.
64
ILC Draft Articles, supra note 28, at 25.
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Projects Case, for example, the ICJ found the plea of necessity inapplicable because
Hungary had “helped, by act or omission to bring” into being the situation of necessity.65
According to the ILC Commentaries, “the contribution to the situation of necessity must
be sufficiently substantial and not merely incidental or peripheral.”66
The CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals all found that any contribution by Argentina
whatsoever, including long range economic planning, was sufficient to invalidate the plea
of necessity. In the words of the Enron Tribunal, “Although each party claims that the
factors precipitating the crisis were either endogenous or exogenous, the truth seems to be
somewhere in between with both kind of factors having intervened… his means that to an
extent there has been a substantial contribution of the State to the situation of necessity
and that it cannot be claimed that the burden falls entirely on exogenous factors.”67
Similarly, the CMS Tribunal notes: “The crisis was not of the making of one particular
administration and found its roots in the earlier crisis of the 1980s and evolving
governmental policies of the 1990s that reached a zenith in 2002 and thereafter.
Therefore, the Tribunal observes that government policies and their shortcomings
significantly contributed to the crisis and the emergency and while exogenous factors did
fuel additional difficulties, they do not exempt the Respondent from its responsibility in
the matter.”68 As a result, these three Tribunals determined that the necessity defense was
unavailable to Argentina because the state had contributed to the crisis.
Again, the LG&E Tribunal took a very different approach to the level of contribution
necessary to exclude the plea of necessity, finding that even if Argentina had contributed
to the underlying economic crisis, that contribution was neither significant nor
intentional. In this respect, the LG&E Tribunal found that “in the first place, Claimants
have not proved that Argentina has contributed to cause the severe crisis faced by the
country; secondly, the attitude adopted by the Argentine Government has shown a desire
to slow down by all the means available the severity of the crisis.”69 The LG&E Tribunal
thus left the plea of necessity open to Argentina.
With respect to the applicability of the necessity defense, there is a clear split in the
65

I.C.J. Reports 1997i, p. 7, at p. 46, ¶ 57.
ILC Commentaries, supra note 28, at art 25, ¶ 20.
67
Enron Award, supra note 33, at ¶ 312.
68
CMS Award, supra note 17, at ¶ 329.
69
LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, at ¶ 256.
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jurisprudence of the ICSID Tribunals to date. While the CMS, Enron, and Sempra
Tribunals significantly limit the availability of the necessity defense and find it
unavailable to Argentina, the LG&E Tribunal offers a far more deferential analysis of the
state’s invocation of necessity and finds the defense to apply in the case of the Argentine
financial crisis. The approach taken by the majority of the tribunals thus far is, again,
problematic because the analysis used by these three Tribunals essentially renders the
necessity defense a legal nullity as a state will, almost without exception, have
contributed at least in some indirect way to whatever emergency it may face and such a
state will also, in almost every circumstance, have more than one possible policy
response to such a situation. If this majority line of jurisprudence is followed, a state
responding to a any crisis, with the possible exception of a truly unforeseeable natural
disaster, despite the technical availability of the necessity defense, will be unable as a
matter of law to successfully invoke the defense and liability will attach to whatever
policy the state may chose to respond to the crisis. Again, as with the Tribunals’ flawed
interpretation of the NPM clause, the result may be to chill states’ willingness to enter
into BIT obligations or to subject themselves to ICSID jurisdiction.

V. THE CMS ANNULMENT COMMITTEE REPORT AND THE VIABILITY OF ICSID
ARBITRATION

The opinions of the four Tribunals that have issued awards in the Argentina cases to
date raise serious questions as to the legitimacy and viability of the ICSID system,
particularly in cases such as these in which disputes implicate fundamental questions of
state policy, such as the appropriate response to a financial crisis or other emergency. The
legitimacy problem arises first from the contradictory holdings of the four Tribunals. The
facts in each of the four cases are identical. In each case Argentina advanced the same
argument—that the actions taken in response to the crisis were necessary to protect
essential security interests and maintain public order under the NPM clause and that the
criteria for the invocation of the necessity defense were met. Likewise, in each case
Argentina presented very similar evidence and expert testimony. Yet, the Tribunals
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reached opposite conclusions, based on different interpretations of the treaty’s NPM
terms and different understandings of the necessity defense in customary international
law.70 The fact that four Tribunals, when confronted with the same facts, evidence, and
argumentation would reach very different interpretations of the law and diametrically
opposite holdings is, itself, sufficient to call into question the legitimacy and viability of
the ICSID arbitral system.
The Argentine cases are, of course, not the first time that investor-state arbitrations
have produced contradictory awards. The now infamous Lauder v. Czech Republic case,
in which Lauder asserted breaches of BIT and contract rights based on the Czech
Republic’s interference with media licenses, involved two separate arbitrations, one
under the U.S.-Czech BIT brought by Lauder and one under the Netherlands-Czech BIT
brought by a CME, a Dutch corporation.71 The two Tribunals in those cases also reached
directly opposite conclusions with respect to whether a causal link existed between the
Czech Republic’s actions and the harms done to Lauder. Those cases led to numerous
calls in both the academic and practitioner communities for reforms to the investor-state
arbitration system and, particularly, the creation of an appellate review system.72 Though
no such reforms were undertaken in the wake of the Lauder cases, the recent Argentine
awards raise once again the danger of inconsistent decisions and lack of appellate review
in the ICSID system.
A second question of legitimacy arising from the Argentine cases relates to the
composition of the Tribunals and the precedential value of ICSID awards. While the three
Argentine cases that narrow the applicability of the NPM clause and restrict the necessity

See CMS Award, supra note 17; LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33 None of these past
decisions is controlling in the interpretation of an NPM clause in a future case. See Statute of the
International Court of Justice art. 30, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993.
71
Compare Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award, ¶ 313 (Sept. 3, 2001), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LauderAward.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2007), with CME Czech Republic
BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶ 575 (Sept. 13, 2001), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2001PartialAward.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005), and CME Czech
Republic BV v. Czech Republic, Final Award, paras. 446-47 (Mar. 14, 2003), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2003-Final 000.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2007).
72
See Charles N. Brower et al., The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication System, 19 ARB. INT'L 415,
430-32 (2003); Susan Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005); Susan Franck,
ICSID Institutional Reform: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution and the Role of Structural Safeguards, in
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL REFORM: PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE JOINT CONFERENCE ON
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Ed. Agata Fijalkowsi) (2007).
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defense now appear to constitute a clear majority position and are being cited as
precedent by other Tribunals, the structure of the ICSID system may well unduly weight
the opinions of particular arbitrators who sit in a number of similar cases. In fact, the
arbitral panels in the CMS, Enron, and Sempra cases had overlapping members. Professor
Francisco Orrego Vicuna served as President of all three Tribunals and Marc Lalonde sat
on both the Sempra and CMS panels. The CMS and Sempra awards not surprisingly
contain verbatim legal analysis of numerous issues and the sole arbitrator in Sempra who
had not also sat in CMS, Sandra Morelli Rico, offered a dissenting opinion that disagreed
with many of the legal conclusions of the other two arbitrators. As Charles Brower has
noted, when considering such cases, “the possibility dawns that selection of the tribunal like jury selection - plays a role more dispositive and less unifying than the text of the
treaty obligations.”73
Of course, the desire for uniformity of jurisprudence might suggest that such
overlapping panels is advantageous as it is more likely to lead to consistent outcomes.
Yet, in a system such as ICSID that lacks appellate review authority, the repetition of
particular arbitrators and, likely, their key holdings in numerous cases may confer greater
legitimacy and precedential weight on particular lines of argument or legal conclusions.74
When panels have the same president and, particularly, when they have a decisive
majority of repeat members, the likelihood that they will analyze identical facts and legal
analysis differently in a second case, declines markedly.75 What appears to occur instead
is that the opinion of particular repeat player arbitrators in these cases is given additional
weight as they decide nearly identical cases based on the same legal and factual analysis
and thereby establish repeat, even if erroneous, precedents. Without appellate review,
those repeat precedents gain perhaps undue weight and authority within the system.
The third, and perhaps the most profound, question of legitimacy presented by the
Argentine ICSID awards to date arises from the substantive decisions of three of the four
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Tribunals with respect to both the NPM clause and the customary defense of necessity.
This majority approach drastically limits the freedom of states to respond to emergency
situations through both a narrow interpretation of the NPM clause and a highly restrictive
reading of the necessity defense. By limiting, or even removing the possibility, of either
of these exemptions from wrongfulness and liability, despite the manifest intent of the
states parties to the BIT to include an NPM provision and maintain the customary defense
of necessity, the Tribunals turn the U.S.-Argentine BIT into a far stronger instrument of
investor protection than the states parties to the treaty likely intended. The failure to give
effect to the clear language of the BIT and to do justice to the intent of the states parties
as manifested in the treaty language is, not surprisingly, causing states to rethink their
commitment to guarantee investor rights through BITs and allow direct investor-state
arbitration before ICSID. After all, BITs represent an explicit bargain between the
benefits of increased investment flows that follow from legalized investor protections and
the need for states to preserve policy flexibility in ways that could impair investor
interests. If ICSID Tribunals fail to recognize or accept the nature of that bargain
underlying many BITs, states may be far less willing to accept direct investor-state
arbitrations that appear to favor, or even expand, investor rights.
These three legitimacy concerns alone have prompted leading scholars and
practitioners to question the viability and legitimacy of investor-state arbitration. More
significantly, they have led some states to withdraw from the ICSD system so as to
minimize the potential for investor-state arbitrations based on their BIT obligations in a
system which they perceive to lack legitimacy. In May 2007, for example, Bolivia
notified the World Bank that it was withdrawing from the ICSID Convention and
Bolivian President Evo Morales urged his Latin American counterparts to do the same.76
Other states such as Venezuela and Ecuador have noted the desire to limit ICSID
jurisdiction and minimize potential BIT liability.77 As states reconsider their commitment
to ICSID in light of these legitimacy challenges, the viability of investor-state arbitration
in its present form is called into question.
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In many respects, the legitimacy challenges presented at least by inconsistent awards
and overlapping tribunal membership are not new; scholars have noted the possibility of
a legitimacy crisis in investor-state arbitration for a number of years. The Argentine cases
do, however, provide reason to revisit these criticisms of the ICSID system, particularly
in light of the narrowing of the necessity defense and the failure of the majority of the
tribunals to give effect to the NPM provision of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.
What does appear to be new in the Argentine cases, however, is an internal recognition
within ICSID itself that the current form and operation of investor-state arbitration may
be problematic. In response to the CMS award against Argentina, the Argentine
Government filed a request for annulment pursuant to Rule 52 of the ICSID Convention.
The September 25, 2007 decision of the Annulment Committee is a surprising and
extraordinary piece of jurisprudence. The decision is so remarkable that it seems difficult
to interpret it as anything but an attack on the ICSID system from within. The decision
carries particular weight because of the membership of the Annulment Committee, which
was composed of three of the most respected international lawyers presently practicing.
Gilbert Guillaume is the President of the International Court of Justice; Nabil Elaraby is a
member of that Court; James Crawford is Whewell Professor of International Law at
Cambridge University and the Rapportuer of the International Law Commission on the
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
Article 52 of the ICSID Convention allows for annulment of arbitral awards only on
the narrowest of grounds: “that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; that the
Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; that there was corruption on the part of a
member of the Tribunal; that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule
of procedure; or that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it was based.”78
Notably the Convention does not provide for review of the legal determinations of the
Tribunal, nor does it allow an annulment committee to overturn the award even on the
most egregious errors of law. As the MINE Annulment Committee observed: “[A]
Tribunal’s disregard of the agreed rules of law would constitute a derogation from the
terms of reference within which the tribunal has been authorized to function… Disregard
of the applicable rules of law must be distinguished form erroneous application of those
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rules which, even if manifestly unwarranted, furnishes no ground for annulment.”79
Argentina, therefore, argued to the Annulment Committee that the CMS award failed to
state the reasons on which its conclusions were based and that the failure to properly
apply the NPM clause (Article XI) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT constituted a manifest
excess of power.80
The CMS Annulment Committee first considered Argentina’s claim that the Tribunal
had failed to state the reasons on which its conclusion that CMS, the claimant, could
enforce the obligations of Argentina to TGN, a subsidiary company. The Annulment
Committee agreed with Argentina, finding that “in the end it is quite unclear how the
Tribunal arrived at its conclusion that CMS could enforce the obligations of Argentina to
TGN….In these circumstances there is a significant lacuna in the award, which makes it
impossible for the reader to follow the reasoning on this point.”81 The Committee
therefore annulled the decision of the Tribunal on this point. However, due to the
severability of the various parts of the award, the Annulment Committee’s decision on
this point did not impact the remainder of the award.
A second issue addressed by the Committee was whether the Tribunal’s failure to give
effect to Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT and its consideration of the customary law
doctrine of necessity jointly with the NPM provision of the BIT involved a failure to state
the reasons for the claim or constituted a manifest excess of power by the Tribunal. The
Committee first found that, while the Tribunal’s logic was troubling, it had stated the
reasons for its decision: “in the Committee’s view, although the motivation of the Award
could certainly have been clearer, a careful reader can follow the implicit reasoning of the
Tribunal.”82 The Committee then turned to the question of whether the failure to apply
Article XI constituted a manifest excess of powers. First, the Committee observed that
Article XI of the BIT and the customary defense of necessity are two separate and
distinct legal standards: “The two texts having a different operation and content, it was
necessary for the Tribunal to take a position on their relationship and decide whether they
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were both applicable in the present case. The Tribunal did not enter into such an analysis,
simply assuming that Article XI and Article 25 are on the same footing. In doing so the
Tribunal made another error of law.”83 Second, the Committee observed that the failure
to apply Article XI constituted another error of law: “As admitted by CMS, the Tribunal
gave an erroneous interpretation of Article XI. In fact, it did not examine whether the
conditions laid down by Article XI were fulfilled and whether, as a consequence, the
measures taken by Argentina were capable of constituting, even prima facie, a breach of
the BIT.84 The Annulment Committee thus attacked the fundamental holding of the
award, observing that “These two errors made by the Tribunal could have had a decisive
impact on the operative part of the award.”85
Despite finding clear legal errors in the CMS award that presumably impacted the
ultimate outcome, the Annulment Committee proceeded to note its own limited powers of
review and found that it lacked the jurisdiction to overturn the award. The Committee
recalled:
that it has only a limited jurisdiction under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. In
these circumstances, the Committee cannot simply substitute its own view of the
law and its own appreciation of the facts for those of the Tribunal.
Notwithstanding the identified errors and lacunas in the Award, it is the case in
the end that that Tribunal applied Article XI of the Treaty. Although applying it
cryptically and defectively, it applied it. There is accordingly no manifest excess
of powers.86
What makes this Annulment Committee report so unusual is that the Committee had
no reason or need to find that the underlying CMS Award was flawed with outcomedeterminative errors. Doctrines of judicial minimalism would dictate that the Tribunal
should have decided the issue on the narrowest possible grounds, in this case a simple
finding that it lacked the jurisdiction to review the award on anything but a manifest
excess of powers and that, lacking such a manifest excess, there was no need for further
consideration of the CMS Tribunal’s legal conclusions.87 Yet, the Annulment Committee
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engaged in an extensive substantive consideration of the Tribunal’s findings, stated in no
uncertain terms that the Award was legally flawed, and suggested that those flaws were
potentially outcome determinative. Careful, conservative, and deliberate international
lawyers, such as the members of the CMS Annulment Committee, would not take such an
approach without good reason.
Two separate explanations of the Annulment Committee’s decision to reach beyond
judicial minimalism and critique the substantive basis of the award seem most plausible.
The first, quite simply, may have been an effort to prevent the CMS Award from having
precedential weight. The Annulment Committee may have found the award and the fact
that its analysis was quickly becoming the majority approach in the Argentine cases so
legally troubling that it sought to vitiate the award of any precedential value and ensure
that subsequent tribunals addressing similar issues did not follow the CMS Tribunal’s line
of analysis.
While the Committee may well have been attempting to deprive the CMS award of
precedential weight, something more may have also been at stake. The Annulment
Committee’s critique of the CMS Tribunal’s award was so blatant and at times even
confrontational that the Committee may have been attempting to call into question the
legitimacy of the CMS Tribunal and, more generally, a system that lacks appellate review
to reverse gross and outcome determinative errors of law. As the Committee observed:
“If the Committee was acting as a court of appeal, it would have to reconsider the Award
on this ground.”88 One can certainly read into the Annulment Committee’s decision a
critical wake-up call to the ICSID system that poor jurisprudence and lack of appellate
review authority are an unsustainable combination.
Whether or not the Annulment Committee intended to throw the ICSID system into a
crisis of legitimacy with the CMS Annulment Report is something we many never know.
The early aftershocks of the CMS Annulment Decision, however, appear to be having
just that effect. In the weeks after the Annulment Decision, senior officials in the
purportedly applying a rule of law, gets it so wrong that it must be regarded as having disregarded the rule
and not really having applied it at all. The purported application of the rule must be so inadequate, and
suffused with such fundamental error, that it transcends the mere commission of an error in applying the
law and becomes instead a veritable case of its non-application.” See Opinion of 20 January 2006 annexed
to the Respondent’s Annulment Reply, ¶ 25, MTD Equity Sdn Bhd.& MTD Chile v. The Republic of Chile
(ICSID Case No. Arb/01/07, Decision on Annulment, 21 March 2007.
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Argentine government have indicated a desire to reach an agreement with the U.S.
publicly clarifying the self-judging nature of the NPM clause in the U.S-Argentine BIT
and have made clear that it will be an extreme political challenge for Argentina to pay
more than US$130 million from the national treasury based on award that has been found
to be legally erroneous.89 At the very least, Argentina, like Bolivia, Uruguay, and
Venezuela, may be rethinking its commitment to investor-state arbitration and the ICSID
system.

VI.

CONCLUSION

While claims about the legitimacy and viability of investor-state arbitration and the
ICSID system are long standing, the Argentine cases present significant new challenges
for the system as a whole. By failing to apply the NPM provisions of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT, the majority approach in these cases has eroded the flexibility states parties sought
to preserve for themselves to respond to extraordinary situations and may have
undermined the bargain between investor protection and state freedom of action that at
least some states parties thought they had agreed to in their BITs. Similarly, by narrowing
the customary defense of necessity to what is effectively a legal nullity, the Tribunals
have further encroached on the only other means for states to avoid wrongfulness and
liability for actions that harm investors taken in response to serious emergencies. To do
so through inconsistent judgments and with reasoning deemed by an annulment
committee to be legally erroneous is all the more problematic.
If Argentina were to follow Bolivia’s lead and exit the ICSID system, investor-state
arbitration would truly face a crisis of confidence. If states do not believe that investorstate arbitration respects their rights, as well as those of investors, they will not consent to
the system and that system itself will run the risk of collapse. Before that happens, a deep
rethinking of the structure, purposes, and jurisprudence of investor-state arbitration is
urgently needed. A variety of solutions have been suggested in the literature, ranging
Statement of Osvaldo Guglielmino, Procurador del Tesoro de la Nación Argentina, American
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from the creation of appellate review authority to the use of the margin of appreciation as
a decision-making framework for the evaluation of state policies that fall within core
domains. Now is the time for an urgent consideration of these and other proposals to
restore both state and investor confidence in ICSID before it is too late. At the very least,
the Argentine cases and the CMS Annulment Report must serve as a wake-up call to
ICSID arbitrators to engage in more careful and deliberate legal reasoning that does
justice both to the texts of the treaties they are interpreting and the intent of the states
parties which drafted those texts.
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